Julian Assange & Wikileaks made headlines in 2010 when they released an “insurance file”, an 1.4GB AES-256-encrypted file available through BitTorrent. Finally, I cover obfuscation & witness-encryption which, combined with proof-of-work, can be said to solve time-lock crypto but currently remain infeasible. I suggest a new time-lock crypto based on chained hashes hashes have been heavily attacked for other purposes, and may be safer than number-squaring. A better time-lock crypto proposal replaces trusted-third-parties with forcibly serial proof-of-work using number squaring and guaranteeing unlocking not after a certain point in time but after sufficient computation-time has been spent it’s unclear how well number-squaring resists optimization or shortcuts. Proposals often resort to trusted-third-parties, which are vulnerabilities. I survey techniques for time-lock crypto.
It is not so easy to achieve adjustable decryptability over time, a “time-lock crypto”: for some uses (data escrow, leaking, insurance, last-resort Bitcoin backups etc), one wants data which is distributed only after a certain point in time. In cryptography, it is easy to adjust encryption of data so that one, some, or all people can decrypt it, or some combination thereof.
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